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FROM THE CHINGUETTI MOSQUE TO DUBAI TOWERS 
 
“EXTRAVERSION”, CONNECTIONS AND NEO-URBAN SOCIETY  
IN A GLOBALIZED MAURITANIA 
 
 
BY ARMELLE CHOPLIN* 
 
 
In July 2009, Mauritanians could see on the web a video of the presidential candidate, 
Mohammed Ould Abdel Aziz, now president of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania.1 The 
video, entitled ‘Le changement constructif”, showed the foundation of a new modern city, 
with skyscrapers, malls, pipelines and luxury resorts. An open water-tap symbolized the 
victory of the development in the desert initiated by President Aziz. In the middle of high 
towers clearly inspired by the Gulf Emirates urban model, was the mosque of Chinguetti.2 For 
present-day urbanized Moorish people, this mosque reminds us of the strong link with the old 
religious towns in the baddiyya (desertic bush). Its image implicitly evokes this space of 
traditional nomadic culture. This old mosque contrasts with the images of a new world-city 
springing up in the desert. Although the video is fictitious, Mauritanians are persuaded to 
think that it could become reality thanks to the announcement of oil exploitation, bringing 
economic development, success and wealth. The Australian oil company, Woodside, 
discovered supplies in 2001 and has been exploiting them since 2006, fostering hopes that 
Mauritania will become a new oil emirate. Unfortunately, this is taking a long time to happen. 
Indeed, this political video seems to be completely extravagant and unrealistic. Its images of a 
globalized Mauritania are at odds with the dramatically weak scores of the country in 
economic and social development.3 In this article, I try to show how globalization is a 
dynamic at work in Mauritania, despite its contradictory effects and unexpected outcomes. I 
will tackle this issue from different but correlated points of view: the economic extraversion 
(see below), the links with the outside world, especially the Middle East, and the symbolic 
connection (branchement), forming new  ideas about the state and discourses of belonging. 
Like many other African countries (Cooper, 2002), Mauritania is involved in a ‘longue 
durée’ process of “extraversion” (Bayart, 2000). Bayart defines “extraversion” as a historical 
phenomenon in which ‘the leading actors in sub-Saharan societies have tended to compensate 
for their difficulties in the autonomization of their power and in intensifying the exploitation 
of their dependants by deliberate recourse to the strategies of extraversion, mobilizing 
resources derived from their (possibly unequal) relationship with the external environment’ 
(Bayart, 2000: 218). We can develop this idea by stressing the fact that in Mauritania, this 
extraversion process is ancient, even if it has changed since the trans-Saharan caravan era of 
Chinguetti (Bonte, 2000). Nowadays, fruit and vegetables, second-hand electrical appliances, 
and also stolen cars, cigarettes and cocaine smuggling have been substituted for the salt 
caravans, gum Arabic, old manuscripts and slave trade. The export of iron and fish provide 
the most important part of the national income. Recently discovered oil and gold exploitation 
are reinforcing this dependence on the sale of natural resources to the outer world. Increasing 
exchanges and flows of objects and people emphasize intense transnational circulation.                                                          
* Université Paris-Est Marne-la-vallée. Armelle.choplin@univ-paris-est.fr 
1 I owe a special debt to Riccardo Ciavolella for his helpful reading and useful suggestions for improvement.  
2 Chinguetti is one of the four ancient towns of Mauritania, with Oulata, Tichitt and Ouadane. It was an 
important place for assembling Maghreb pilgrims on the way to Mecca. The city is renowned for its rich libraries 
with medieval manuscripts. Before modern Mauritania, the Moors were identified as natives from Bilad ash-
Shinguitt. 
3 In 2005, half the Mauritanian population lived below the poverty line. The human development index (HDI) 
ranked the country at 154th out of 175. In 2008it was ranked 137th. 
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Obviously, theses new exchanges and connections entail important spatial and identity 
changes. As the prospective future physiognomy of the capital city Nouakchott shows, the 
modern insertion of Mauritania into the global economy has a critical impact on a symbolic 
dimension, by reference to the Gulf Emirates. For this peripheral Arab state, the Gulf 
Emirates epitomize economic development, success and wealth, thanks to oil exploitation, 
and represent a specific cultural model, a specific idea of modernity. This is particularly 
important for the Mauritanian government, for which the belonging to the Arab world is a 
contested political issue. Thus, the Gulf architectural and urban model symbolizes the 
materialization of the Arab route to hyper-modernity. The Al-Khaima Centre, the new luxury 
shopping mall erected in Nouakchott downtown, presents one of the more outstanding 
illustrations of this sharp shift. The tent evokes traditional society and pretends to symbolize a 
direct continuity with the past dimension of nomadic and rural life. While claiming 
authenticity, it represents the contemporary and globalized need of displaying tradition 
merged with hyper-modern urban architecture and the centre attracts a new urban society. The 
state turns to Dubai towers rather than to Chinguetti mosque, while the elite and the new 
generation of urban Mauritanians are caught between rhetorically affirmed traditional values 
and new aspirations to the Dubai version of modernity. Through this opposition between 
Chinguetti mosque and Dubai towers, I would enhance the ambivalence of globalization: on 
one hand, the process is structural and its effects are evident, materializing in economic 
development and urban changes. But for the great majority of Mauritanians, the globalization 
is more symbolic than real and gives rise to frustration. 
 
 
Fig. 2 The Chinguetti mosque. Photo : A. Choplin, 2004  
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FIG. 2 THE Al-Khaima center with the nomadic tent on the top.  
Photo : A. Choplin, 2008 
   
CRUDE OIL INSTEAD OF GUM ARABIC: ECONOMIC “EXTRAVERSION” AND THE NEW 
GEOPOLITICAL FRAME 
 
The modern Mauritanian territory has been a space of multiple commercial flows since 
the time of the Moorish emirates and Senegal River Wolof, Haalpulaar and Soninke political 
entities. Interactions with Europeans first consolidated internal and external slave trade and 
then, with the French settling along the Senegal River, intensified the gum Arabic trade and 
commercial paths between southern Morocco and Senegal (Bonte, 2000). Moorish merchants 
moving around the whole region between Mauritania, Senegal and The Gambia had been 
powerful middlemen in the groundnut (and other items) trade, while controlling the Saharan 
commercial pathways and participating in the river transportation system. Even with 
colonization from the beginning of the 20th century, the French were more interested in trade 
and export than in local production. In the north, iron mining only began in 1952 with the 
establishment of the French company Mines de fer de Mauritanie (MIFERMA) (Bonte, 2001). 
A 700 km railway linked the iron mining centre of Zouerate with the port of Nouadhibou. 
With independence in 1960, the extraversion of Mauritania went on. The economy remained 
polarized on Senegal: the country’s first road (1970) linked Nouakchott to Rosso and, by 
extension, the port of Dakar, the principal supply  point for Mauritania. Rapidly, popular and 
leftist political and intellectual movements denounced this dependence on the former 
colonizing country and Senegal and criticized it as an obstacle to the existence of Mauritania 
as an independent and self-reliant state. The first president, Moktar Ould Daddah, tried to 
break French influence: in 1973, the country became a member of the Arab League, 
reconsidered cooperation agreements with France and replaced the CFA franc with the 
ouguiyas currency (Ould Daddah, 2003). In 1974, MIFERMA was nationalized and became 
the Société nationale industrielle et minière (SNIM). In order to refocus the country's 
economic activities on the national arena, the government undertook major schemes to build 
new infrastructures: it enlarged the Nouakchott airport and created a new port. It inaugurated 
the new road, the Route de l’espoir, in 1978, thus linking the capital to the eastern regions 
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which had previously turned to neighbouring Mali. Finally, Daddah joined the war against the 
Polisario in 1975 in order to assert Mauritanian sovereignty over the occupied Western Sahara 
area. These symbolic acts aimed to announce the birth of Mauritania as a real independent 
country. 
In the 1970s, the droughts caused a crisis in the agropastoral system: rural masses 
migrated to Nouakchott hoping to convert to modern working activities. In order to diversify 
the national income and to find new sources for food supplies, the government turned towards 
the seaside, hitherto a neglected area (Le Coeur, 1994). Thus, the 1980s were characterized by 
an increasing exploitation of local fish resources. This made Nouadhibou a prominent 
economic centre, attracting new activities. It became the newly declared economic capital of 
the country, where fortunes could be made very quickly.4  
Mauritanian geopolitical relations followed this economic evolution. The government 
tightened links with Russia, where some young students and future intellectuals were trained, 
and China, which became a friend country. Beijing financed and built up the presidential 
palace and many other infrastructures such as roads, the power station and especially the port 
in Nouakchott. Under the authoritarian rule of President Taya (from 1984), political and 
economic collaboration grew with Libya and Iraq, two Arab countries considered progressive. 
The government policies of Arabization, which turned out explicitly to be discriminatory 
against Negro-Mauritanians in the 1980s, explained these geopolitical reorientations. This led 
to the 1989 events, an international crisis with Senegal. Mauritania was then supported by 
Saddam Hussein, even if the rest of the Arab world supported Dakar rather than Nouakchott..5 
This alliance became embarrassing after the first Gulf war and the dramatic overturning of 
Taya. 
During the 1990s, Taya’s government was looking for support and legitimacy from 
western countries and the international community. Particularly, it was seeking World Bank 
support. President Taya opted for a democratization process and allowed so-called 
‘transparent’ elections in 1992. Israel opened an embassy in 2001 in Nouakchott. 
Democratization and these new relationships consolidated the ruling elite and favoured the 
conversion of the privileged traditional elite from rural activities to modern business, 
controlling new profitable economic sectors (fishing, finance via Arab capital, contracts with 
foreign donors). 
The recent oil discoveries forecast a new stage of this extraversion process.6 Mauritania 
is strengthening its ties with the Arabian Peninsula. The business elite thinks that their vast 
and underpopulated country7 could follow the model of the Emirates. In March 2008, Qatar’s 
emir, Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa Al Thani, paid a visit to President Sidi Ould Cheikh 
Abdallahi. They signed an economic agreement. In April 2008, Sultan Ahmed Bin Selim, 
manager of Dubai International Development, came to visit Nouakchott with a delegation of 
UAE investors, in order to evaluate investment opportunities, particularly in the banking, 
energy, tourism and mining sectors. The emir of Qatar is planning to create a joint business 
company for facilitating transactions between Mauritania and the Arab Peninsula, for 
Mauritanian businessmen frequently travelling to the Gulf. The flying and shipping lines 
between Nouakchott and Dubai have fostered increasing flows of containers from the emirate                                                         
4 In 1970, the population of Nouadhibou was already estimated at 18,000 inhabitants, consisting of 11,500 
Mauritanians, 3,000 sub-Saharan Africans, 1,800 French and 1,000 Spanish, mainly from the Canary Islands 
(Bonte, 2001).  
5 Senegalese and Mauritanians used the expression ‘events of 1989’ to refer to the struggles that took place along 
the Senegal River in April 1989. Fuelled by the Mauritanian government, and initially with Moors opposing the 
black African population, the situation degenerated into open conflict between the two countries. The Senegalese 
residents were driven out of Mauritania, and, in retaliation, Mauritanians were evicted from Senegal. See 
Leservoisier, 1994; Fresia, 2009; Ciavolella, 2010. 
6 For more details on this extraversion process, see Choplin and Lombard, 2009.  
7 Three million inhabitants in 2007. 
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(estimated at 30 per cent of container admissions at the port of Nouakchott, while 25 per cent 
are from China).8 
Libya is another critical partner. It has expanded its relations with Mauritania since 
2005. Uneasy relationships marked the early 2000s at the time of the Mauritanian recognition 
of the Hebrew state of Israel. But nowadays, after several regime changes in Mauritania, 
Colonel Qaddafi seems to be finding a more favourable context for building up partnerships, 
and is apparently interested in the new oil production in Mauritania. In March 2009, following 
the expulsion of Israel’s ambassador by President Aziz, Qaddafi went to Nouakchott. He 
proposed to allocate $500 million for investment and cancelled the debt interest to facilitate 
Mauritanian development. He tried to mediate between Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, the 
military coup’s leader, and the Front National de Défense de la Démocratie (FNDD), with 
obvious sympathy for the former. It is said that he financed President Aziz’s political 
campaign. He also invited him, as the new elected president, to celebrate his 40 years in 
power. 
However, political reconciliation and economic exchanges with the Arab world should 
not be overestimated. Multiple projects are promised, but the outcomes are still to be seen, 
while incomes remain low. The oil particularly is not profitable. The offshore oilfields, 90 km 
southwest of Nouakchott, have been exploited since 2006 by Woodside. In late 2007, after an 
embezzlement scandal, Woodside sold its operating licence to the Malaysian giant oil 
company, Petronas. Various oil companies were granted new oilfields discovered in the 
onshore Taoudenni area: Total (France), Repsol (Spain) and CNPC (China). The experts 
estimate the potential supplies at 400 million barrels of crude oil: Mauritania could become 
one of the ten largest African producers. Moreover, 30 billion cubic metres of gas is still 
untapped. Actually, the daily extraction, initially estimated at 75,000 barrels,9 is only around 
15,000 barrels. Moreover, the oil is poor in quality and so is sold below world prices. In 2006, 
the oil production yielded 132 million ouguiyas but, one year later, only 55 million ($19 
million),10 far from the $350 million per year initially announced. 
 
 
NOUAKCHOTT, DAKAR, DUBAI, YIWU : CONNECTED NETWORKS, PLACES AND PEOPLE 
 
These new policies generate connections with several countries. They entail new parallel 
circulation led by some members from the politico-commercial elite (Bayart, 1993), who 
operate inside the main political circles. Some transnational groups take advantage from 
trading. However, even ordinary individuals participate in these transactions. Many foreigners 
find Mauritania is under-exploited in economic terms for new business activities and are 
frequently going back and forth between their native country and Mauritania.  
Obviously, the most important group participating in this network economy is the 
Mauritanian diaspora.11 It is large, discreet but influential, particularly the long-lasting 
established Moorish diasporas. Some eastern tribes have created transnational business 
networks, for example the Ideyboussat and Tajakanet tribes, powerful respectively in the 
Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa. Actually, the Tajakanet tribe is known for its religious 
influence and its links with diamond extraction (Ould Cheikh, 2004). After doing business in 
Angola, Sierra Leone and Liberia, some of them have been able to transform this economic 
and financial capital into  political capital, becoming important political personalities.                                                          
8 Figures and information gathered in Nouakchott, November 2008. 
9 Marchés tropicaux no. 1536, 2004. 
10 Office National des Statistiques, Annuaire statistique 2007.  
11 250,000 Mauritanians live abroad, 10 per cent of the total population, and a larger overall number than that of 
foreigners resident in Mauritania, 50,000 of which live in the Cote d’Ivoire, 20,000 in Saudi Arabia, 20,000 in 
France, 20,000 in The Gambia, 20,000 in Mali, 10,000 in Senegal, 4,000 in the United Arab Emirates, 2,500 in 
Congo and 2,000 in the Canary Islands (Ould Ramdan, 2007).  
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Other tribal strategies have a specific transnational dimension, specifically the large tribe 
of the Kunta, living on both sides of the Mauritanian-Malian border. Its spatial influence gives 
some of its members the opportunity to develop business in Senegal, Mauritania, Mali and 
Algeria (Scheele, 2008). For instance, some members have spun off an important bus 
company (SONEF) between Nouakchott and Bamako, benefiting from government 
compliance. While all the Malian bus companies had problems with Mauritanian authorities 
in October 2008, the Kunta’s buses ran easily between both countries. 
The recent work by Lesourd (2006) on Mauritanian businesswomen has clearly shown 
some successful strategies in international trades. She presents some petites commerçantes 
who move between neighbouring countries such as Senegal or Morocco. Some of them often 
visit Las Palmas in the Canary Islands, considered by some Moors as the Mauritania 
supermarket. The grandes commerçantes have been moving between Nouakchott and Paris, 
where they stock up with on luxury goods, and more recently the Arab Peninsula. They take 
advantage of the pilgrimage to go and visit Dubai where they buy jewellery, handbags and 
shoes and sell them once back in Mauritania. Finally, the richest minority even goes to China. 
They visit Shanghai, Guangzhou and especially Yiwu, a city in southeastern China where 
Arab traders regularly go (Pliez, 2007) and 200 Mauritanians live (Gaborit, 2007). 
Although they do not operate on the same scale, Mauritanian Soninke traders occupy a 
key place in the import sector. They provide Mauritanian markets with second-hand items. In 
a downtown neighbourhood called Arrivage, they sell old refrigerators, televisions, flatirons, 
sewing machines, computers, hi-fi equipment, clothes and bicycles. All the managers of these 
shops are Soninke natives of Kaedi, the principal town of the Middle Senegal River valley, 
and live in the Netherlands, Germany or France, where there has been an important diaspora 
since the 1950s. They travel back and forth between Europe and Mauritania every two or 
three months. In Europe, they buy second-hand merchandise; in Nouakchott they receive and 
unload their containers. In the last years, this initial configuration between Europe and 
Mauritania has expanded, in particular to Senegal and Mali, where Soninke traders have 
relatives, and recently even directly to China. These businessmen and businesswomen can act 
both alone through individual entrepreneurship and collectively, in particular thanks to 
diasporic kinship networks. Their mobility and trade activities rely on extensive transnational 
networks. 
Moreover, many foreigners, particularly Senegalese, Guineans and Malians, live in 
Mauritania. They have constituted an important part of the Mauritanian population since 
independence. Yet the recent concern of European media and institutions over migrants in 
small fishing boats has led to a focus on clandestinity even within Mauritanian borders. This 
results in confusion between long-term immigration in Mauritania and recent migratory 
transit through Mauritania towards Europe, neglecting the first one.12 West African migrants 
have been essential for Mauritanian economic dynamism. Nouakchott and Nouadhibou 
played an important role in West African migration. At independence, 70 per cent of 
Mauritanians were nomads, and skilled labourers were lacking. Nationals from Senegal, Mali, 
Guinea or Benin filled administrative posts. They also invested in the construction, electricity, 
plumbing and laundry sectors. From 1957 onwards, the construction of the new capital, 
Nouakchott, offered new employment opportunities. At the same time, Nouadhibou’s 
importance grew with the mine’s exploitation. In the 1970s, the government developed 
marine activities, but not many local people showed any interest in these economic 
possibilities. For that reason, Senegalese fishermen settled in the area and exploited them 
(Marfaing, 2005). With the discovery and first extraction of oil, Mauritania continues to 
attract sub-Saharan labourers. Although distinctive, this long tradition of immigration is                                                         
12 I have published various articles based on field research on this topic, for instance Choplin (2008a), Choplin 
and Lombard (2008), Choplin (2010).   
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closely entangled with migratory transit to Europe. Thanks to this presence, foreigners have 
become active in exchanges with their countries of origin. They usually buy appliances and 
mobile phones in Nouadhibou to sell them in the Senegalese capital. Then, they come back 
from Dakar to Mauritania with belts, jewellery, shoes and other items made in China. Thus, 
the trajectories of these African traders overlap those of transit migrants (Streiff-Fénart and 
Poutignat, 2006; Choplin and Lombard, 2008). Thus mobility cannot be reduced to the simple 
migration of Africans wishing to pass into Europe. People from many countries (Mauritania, 
Senegal, Mali, Guinea, etc) have activities (as businessmen, traders, transporters, fishermen, 
pilgrims), which can be as diverse as their spatial trajectories (long-standing immigrants, 
transnational groups, illegal migrants, diaspora, etc). 
 
 
Fig. 3 : Migration routes in Mauritania. (Choplin, 2008a) 
 
Diasporas, international businessmen, traders and immigrants have fostered a long 
tradition of regional interactions and exchanges which have critically influenced the country’s 
evolution. Nowadays, Mauritania, Nouakchott and Nouadhibou are tied to Dakar, Saint-
Louis, Bamako, and also to Paris, Hamburg, Yiwu, etc, situating them at the core of a broad 
transnational region. The image of the country has changed. It is no longer a desert country 
only inhabited by rural populations, especially nomads, living in the bush (bâdiyya in 
hassâniyya or ladde in pulaar), as depicted by shared foreign and national self-representation 
(Choplin and Ciavolella, 2008). Even the meanings of mobility and translocality have 
changed. The most mobile people are now a privileged minority of urban dwellers and 
immigrants actively involved in travelling and trading. The rebranding of Nouakchott is also 
striking. It is not any more the capital of nomads (implying Moorish nomads), but a 
cosmopolitan Saharan city (Brachet 2009 ; Boesen and Marfaing 2007), clearly different from 
the otherwise rather austere towns of the Mauritanian desert. Foreigners produce their own 
urban spaces and landmarks. The presence of migrants revives historical links with Senegal. It 
reminds us of the same Senegalese atmosphere that reigned there when it was founded, an 
atmosphere that Arab governments have, throughout the last three decades, rather clumsily 
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tried to hide (Choplin, 2009). Previously turned towards its hinterland, the Mauritanian nation 
is now looking far beyond the sea, a new both symbolic and geographic branchement which 
epitomizes a profound space reversal.  
  
TERRITORIAL REVERSAL: NOUADHIBOU’S DECLINE AND NOUAKCHOTT’S REVIVAL  
 
This ‘offshore Mauritania’ (Choplin and Lombard, 2009) turns to opportunities given 
by extraversion and external exchanges rather than in a sustainable and well-balanced 
development of internal national economic activities. With this very selective process, some 
places become more important than others, engaging a process of critical spatial 
transformations.  
First of all, the position of cities is changing. In the last few years, Nouakchott has 
gained a prominent role in economic activities by attracting all the transnational and 
‘translocal networks’ (Appadurai, 1996) in Mauritania. The political capital is thus replacing 
Nouadhibou as the economic capital of the country. In the 1980s, Nouadhibou benefited from 
fishing, export and mining income and was a flourishing economic city. Thirty years later, the 
situation has dramatically changed. The northern town of Nouadhibou is now in decline. 
Shipwrecks are rusting in the bay, fisheries infrastructures are deteriorating, the airport is 
moribund and fish captures are getting lower. The economic situation is worsening, even with 
the expected new road linking Nouadhibou to Nouakchott. Inaugurated in 2005, this road was 
supposed to open up the town and the whole northern region. However, in reality vehicles 
going to Western Sahara/Morocco bypass Nouadhibou as the town is no longer an essential 
relay centre for transport with the Maghreb. The road also facilitates a new mobility for 
Nouadhibou inhabitants searching for new activities. They move to Nouakchott where they 
can find more economic opportunities and send children to better schools. More than ever, the 
former economical capital depends on Nouakchott. 
This economic decline accompanies a worsening of Nouadhibou’s reputation all over 
the country. Institutions, media, politicians and economic entrepreneurs represent the city in a 
negative way. The media in particular describe drugs smuggling, alcohol consumption, 
prostitution, AIDS diffusion and recently clandestine migrations as scourging the city. If we 
use Scheele’s (2008) definition of economic activities in the Saharan zone, we can say that 
Nouadhibou is the setting for ‘haram activities’ (vicious) whereas Nouakchott benefits from 
‘hallal activities’ (virtuous). This is noticeable, for example, with the ambiguous management 
of the issue of migration. Although the number of migrants probably increased immediately 
after controls tightened in 2006,13 two years later, field research evidence shows a clear 
reduction in overall numbers. Thus, migration has turned from a transit to a post-transit 
situation, where transcontinental crossings of newly arrived migrants towards Europe are 
decreasing (Choplin, 2010). Nevertheless, international organizations on the ground are 
gaining an interest in the migration issue, and it remains of public concern in media and 
political debates. They continue to produce migration statistics, often exaggerating the 
number of migrants as a justification of their interference in Mauritanian internal affairs and 
drastic border controls. There is a spatial and temporal distortion between the past problem of 
migration and the present-day initiative to tackle it, even if it is declining in numbers and 
importance. The real problem of migration is now the dramatic living conditions of migrants 
stuck in Nouadhibou and not their attempts to cross the sea. But this distortion is also spatial: 
the issue of migration has some importance most of all for Nouadhibou and for failing                                                         
13 The European Union started to intervene from April 2006 onwards, by setting up a system of surveillance as 
part of Frontex, the agency in charge of managing EU external borders: one helicopter and several surveillance 
crafts were sent out, and men from the Spanish Guardia Civil were dispatched to train Mauritanian police in 
border control.  
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migrants living there, but money from international organizations arrives in Nouakchott. This 
finally reinforces the break between the two cities, making the spatial reversal obvious. If 
Nouakchott has always had difficulties in imposing itself as the real capital of Mauritania, this 
post-colonial town is now replacing the inherited colonial major city. Nouadhibou’s decline 
announces the definitive centralization of political and economical power in Nouakchott. But 
this predominance of the capital city is possible only to the detriment of the rest of the 
country. 
Nowadays, Nouakchott is both the first and maybe the only pole of concentration of 
political power and economic activities and the principal national gate for contacts and 
connections with the outer world. It is a sort of knot between national and transnational 
networks, a condition which has a remarkable impact on the town’s evolution. The petro-
dollar inflows entail urban changes, characterized by prestigious projects. The first historical 
colonial buildings in downtown have been destroyed to create a new central business district. 
The town council has decided to erect five skyscrapers. One of them will be the Oil Tower. 
Gulf companies are promoting many projects changing the urban setting. On the margins of 
the Arab and Muslim world, Mauritania offers a strategic geopolitical situation where these 
Gulf actors, especially Qatar, can exert their influence. Gulf companies have their 
headquarters downtown, in new luxury buildings like the Al-Khaima Centre. One of these, the 
Qatari Diar Real Estate Company, is promoting a $1-million luxurious resort 20 km north of 
the capital. Libyans are building a 30-floor hotel. Kuwaiti businessmen have planned to build 
another one in the north of the city. These new urban projects symbolize modernity, hope and 




Fig 4 : Nouakchott : a little downtown ; vast suburbs (Choplin, 2009) 
 
 
IN AND OUT: A MODERN CAPITAL FOR A MODERN SOCIETY?  
 
Dish satellites have sprung up as far as the non-electrified edges of Nouakchott. Such 
contrasts epitomize a particular type of entry into global dynamics for Mauritania and 
Mauritanians. The capital city has become the showcase of internationalization, a tool for 
attracting flows of capital, for generating new inward investments and for speculation in land 
tenure. Yet, this globalization process is selective for spaces and also for people. Some groups 
are in, that is to say within the realm of, the globalizing world, and some are out. This 
becomes clear even through the discourse of the Nouakchott mayor, Ahmed Ould Hamza. 
While promoting a modern image of Nouakchott and the struggle against the ‘mentalités 
rétrogrades’, he told me: ‘On ne peut plus avoir des bédouins dans la ville, qui veulent 
continuer à vivre en ville comme en brousse’ (interview, 26 September 2008, Nouakchott). 
The re-imaging of the capital goes with identity changes in neo-urban society, in particular 
among the elite and the young generation. 
Mauritanian people and the elite in particular adopt an ambivalent attitude towards the 
urban world, and therefore to the bush. They reject the urban way of life and glorify the 
traditional nomadic one. This elite, especially the Moorish one, hopes to revive the 
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supposedly real values of the bush, tent, camel and tea. But despite the political rhetoric of 
governments and Moorish elites about reviving a traditional society and making it modern, 
historical, trading and religious centres such as Chinguetti, Ouadane, Tichitt and Oualata are 
nothing but symbols of a declining world. In spite of new infrastructures and equipment 
(roads, electrification, the mobile phone network) that have sporadically given an economic 
impulse, these small towns are struggling to survive in the middle of an encroaching desert. In 
the last years, they have come to rely exclusively on tourism, which is potentially 
transforming them into museum towns for European people searching for real nomads and 
desert panoramas. But spatial transformations are not only about contrasts between rhetoric 
representations of the traditional locus of ‘being Mauritanian’ and the crude reality of a new 
urban society. Young Nouakchottois in particular can be awkward when they arrive in the 
bush, wearing brand-new Pierre Cardin shirts and leather shoes. Usually, they laugh at their 
cousins staying in the village, whom they pejoratively call broussards (Ciavolella, 2009). 
Moreover, they have some difficulties about standing the austerity of rural life and the fatigue 
of farming and field chores, such as fetching water, collecting firewood and herding cattle. 
But the bush is no longer sufficient for the global elite looking for new horizons. Most 
of elite members in reality act as if they were escaping from Mauritania, by dreaming of a 
modern Mauritania, or of being somewhere else in luxury places. The wealthier women pay 
for very expensive private schools for their children in Nouakchott, Europe or the United 
States, or take them to visit the orthodontist in Las Palmas in the Canary Islands. After work, 
some of them go to the Olympic stadium for walking or, for the more courageous of them, 
running to lose weight. In Nouakchott, they take refuge in places like restaurants, private 
saloons, clubs and rich suburbs, where they can nearly disconnect from real-life Mauritania 
and attach themselves to ephemeral symbolic spaces of luxury and modernity. These places 
are located in Nouakchott but they could be outside the capital city, everywhere else in the 
world, as they are completely cut off from real Mauritanian life (as endured by the rest of 
Mauritanian people even if they do not, or pretend not to, feel it). It reminds us of Foucault’s 
concept of heterotopy,14 of the utopia of being somewhere else, the myth of finding elements 
and symbols to construct identity outside the real social space of life. The elite dreams about 
resorts and casinos in Canary Islands, travels in Europe and above all goes to shopping malls 
in the Arabian Peninsula. In luxurious air-conditioned villas, they share their dreams of this 
new mixture of orientalism and occidentalism.  
This new elite lives in entre-soi, far away from the rest of the Mauritanian population. 
They choose to get away by moving into new distant suburbs like Maouiyya City 3 km from 
the capital, or the Antennes, an outlying area 10 km north of the city. The security companies 
are now trendy. By going out towards the northern fringes of the city, this elite abandons the 
south of the city to the poorest and deepens both the spatial and the social separation. The 
main street, Abdel Nasser Avenue, clarifies this boundary, dividing the city in two distinct 
parts: the rich one in the North (Tevragh-Zeina district) and the poor one in the south 
(Sebkha, El Mina). Around these limits, the city centre is declining as a daily living space, 
turning into a simple territory of symbolic representation of power and the appropriate social 
setting for the elite to show its richness and its prestige, as the 4x4 luxury car trips of elite 
women demonstrate. 
From the luxury residential areas, the happy few try to find their way out from 
Nouakchott, the urban artifice. But the upper class shares this feeling with the lower classes, 
with those inhabitants who have less opportunity to escape from it physically and 
symbolically. ‘We are all strangers in Nouakchott,’ is a common saying (Marchi, 1998). This 
feeling of foreignness reflects a negative image of this city. They say it is not a real city                                                         
14 ‘Il y a […] des sortes de lieux qui sont hors de tous les lieux, bien que pourtant ils soient effectivement 
localisables. Ces lieux, parce qu'ils sont absolument autres que tous les emplacements qu'ils reflètent et dont ils 
parlent, je les appellerai, par opposition aux utopies, les hétérotopies’ (Foucault, 1994).  
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because it is not as modern as Dakar, Dubai or European capitals. All these examples prove 
that this elite seems to be torn between the desire to reconnect with real life (the nomadic one) 
and its lifestyle, which is partially westernised and Dubai-orientalized. This notorious 
schizophrenia is producing a specific and peculiar way of life, created, felt and seen as a 
combination of some traditional elements (boubous and melhafa are worn daily by important 
people, the khaima is still put up in the family courtyard) and some modern ones (four-wheel 
drives, low-calorie diets). This could epitomize both a specific Mauritanian enrolment in 
global modernity and a social unrest. This entails a paradoxical feeling in relation to the city, 
between attraction and repulsion, fear and reassurance. 
 
Young people feel a similar ambivalent sensation but not between ‘traditional’ imagined 
society and the urban world. It is rather between their new urban ‘expectations of modernity’ 
as Ferguson (1999) calls them, and the real opportunities to concretize them. From this 
contradiction, a new urban cultural ferment is stirring. We can deal with this issue from two 
different points of view: the cultural and political messages and meanings of this urban 
culture and its spatial materialization in the urban context. As regards political and cultural 
content, young Nouakchottois are receptive to what Jean and John Comaroff (2000) call the 
‘global culture of youth’. These young people feel excluded from business and neglected by 
the government, and that is precisely why they use the city as their major way to express their 
anger and hopes. Young people’s culture emerges as a key player even in informal urban 
politics by directing their lifestyles, modes of interaction, sociality and even political 
consciousness on critical issues, even if they hardly deal directly with local national politics. 
Even though they cannot go out of Nouakchott, they express a strong désir d’ailleurs, just like 
their Senegalese neighbours (Fouquet, 2007). To materialize this, they mobilize music and 
any other artistic path that can express their imagination and aspirations. Rap and hip-hop are 
the most important urban modes of cultural expression. For ten years, this kind of music has 
been very trendy. Some singers like Monza and bands like Diam Min Tekki, Military 
Underground and Ewlad Leblad communicate on national topics (poverty, corruption, drugs, 
housing problems) and on more general issues (illegal immigration, war in Iraq, Israeli-
Palestinian conflict..). Natives from popular and poor areas of Nouakchott (Cinquième, 
Sixième, Médina) present themselves as people coming from the ghetto or the banlieue, 
paraphrasing western hip-hop rhetoric. They identify themselves and become identified with 
these parts of the city, which have become their territory, a claimed territory. The recent self-
organized hip-hop festival, Assalamalekum, shows that the young people profit from the few 
spaces of freedom conceded by the state, which is not very active in cultural events. Painters 
follow the same independent strategy, by creating La maison des artistes. Since 2002–3, 
exhibitions of painters’ or sculptors’ work have been put on in quite a few places in the 
capital. These new forms of expression are just at their early beginning: several spontaneous 
events like rap beats take place in open spaces of popular districts. In addition, even if 
Moorish and black Mauritanian young people do not listen exactly to the same music,15 there 
is an initial convergence as they share similar global culture references. Despite their relative 
isolation at the global level, these young people do not only receive passively the global 
cultural flows depicting new diasporic ‘ethnoscapes’ (Appadurai, 1996). They also actively 
participate in global culture formation and diffusion, while trying to make their voices heard. 
In the urban milieu, young people are better connected to various information networks 
(the Arabic-language channels, notably Al-Jazeera, and the internet). This is linked to an                                                         15 Moorish young people seem to prefer Arab music imported from the Middle East to rap groups from New 
York/Bronx. They are more likely to watch  the Star Academy and Lebanese clips than black American rappers 
on MTV. On their MP3 players, Moorish girls download the provocative songs by Nancy Ajram and follow on 
TV the Arab poetry contest in the UAE. They particularly support the Moorish candidate, Sidi Mohamed Ould 
Bamba who was crowned in August 2008 in Abu Dhabi as Emir of the Poets (information: discussion with 
Céline Lesourd). 
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increasing radicalization of political discourse. On the margins of the capital, in these areas 
both connected to globalization and excluded from its benefits, some youngsters are attracted 
by the spreading Islamic fundamentalism, adopting new anti-system approaches to political 
mobilization and a moralist vision of society (Choplin and Ciavolella, 2008; Choplin, 2008b). 
These views are directed at the moral regeneration of government, and resonate with poor 
citizens who watch Nouakchott’s skyline being dotted with an increasing number of palatial 
residences. Never before has luxury been more conspicuous. People begin to question the 
source of this new-found wealth and denounce corruption. The new government claimed to 
fight against this scourge, but with few results (Ciavolella, 2009). Many other black and 
immoral activities are seen as related to elite and power networks and nourishing extremist 
conflicts. Drug consumption and trade (cocaine, hashish) in particular are flourishing, 
showing that Mauritania has become a hub for Mafia networks which are supposed to be 
linked to power networks which facilitate easy operations in the country. Young poor people 
especially face these contradictions between richness, ostentation and their condition and 
between moral rhetoric and the suspicion of immoral activities related to the state. Thus, some 
people easily turn towards harshly criticizing political movements. Wahhabi Islamic readings, 
spread through Saudi influence and Islamist NGOs, have begun to appear in the poorer areas 
(Arafat, Dar Naïm, El Mina, Riyad). Yahya Ould El Bara, a sociologist and Mauritanian 
Islam expert (2003) has described the rise in the number of mosques in the last few years: 
between 1967 and 2003 their number rose from 17 to 617. Of these, 322 were sponsored by 
benefactors from the Persian Gulf and 17 were distinctly fundamentalist in their political and 
religious approaches. 
The most notable of these fundamentalist mosques is in El Mina, an impoverished part 
of the city. A large number of the faithful at this mosque are young haratin (descendants of 
former slaves), who are particularly attracted by the egalitarian discourse of the supposedly 
orthodox and pure Islam (ICG, 2005). The haratin criticize the traditional Mauritanian form 
of Islam based on sufi brotherhoods that has never really deeply questioned the oppressive 
traditional social hierarchies. In fact, fundamentalism provides a means to challenge the 
hegemony of the Marabout tribal chiefs who see themselves as the custodians of the religion.  
Even if these new extremist affiliations in the Nouakchott peripheries are not directly 
connected to a terrorist movement (Choplin, 2008b), we should remind the reader that 
Mauritania has been suffering terrorist attacks since 2007, with Al-Qaeda claiming 
responsibility for them.16 The capital city was targeted by terrorist attacks in February 2008, 
hitting Nouakchott’s biggest nightclub and the nearby Israeli Embassy. Once again, Al-Qaeda 
in the Maghreb claimed responsibility. In 2009, several events reinforced the crisis: gun 
battles between terrorists and policemen in Nouakchott; the murder of an American expatriate 
working in humanitarian aid projects in the street in broad daylight; and the first suicide 
bombing, that took place on 9 August outside the French embassy. The spread of these 
movements, although sporadic, give an image of instability in the capital. The inhabitants of 
Nouakchott are quite anxious because the city is now turning into a frightening and unsafe 
place. 
In light of these remarks, it is clear that Mauritania is participating in globalization 
thanks to its political and economic links, diasporas, transnational networks and groups, 
translocal connections spread by migrants and openness to global cultural flows. 
Nevertheless, this participation is highly selective both in spatial and social terms. As                                                         16 The first big attack took place on 24 December 2007. Four French tourists were brutally murdered. It quickly 
became clear that this was not an ordinary crime, but rather a terrorist attack. Two days later, three soldiers were 
killed at the Al Ghallawia military base in northern Mauritania. The Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic 
Maghreb (AQIM), formerly the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), claimed 
responsibility for the attack.  
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Ferguson put it, ‘such networks of political and economic connection do indeed span the 
globe, but they do not cover it’ (Ferguson, 2006: 14). From a structural and economic point of 
view, Mauritanians are involved in a globe-hopping process rather than a globe-covering one. 
The increasing of “extraversion” has produced a situation where some places and social 
groups are ‘in’, globalized, whereas some others are ‘out’ suffering from increasing 
marginalization and disconnection. As we have seen, for example, this process has been 
prejudicial to Nouadhibou and its inhabitants as long as it is losing its historical role as the 
economic capital and gaining a terrific new role as a haram activities centre. Bleak and distant 
regions and their rural populations continue to be excluded, and this disconnection seems to 
become even more critical now, when new opportunities for development and social 
improvement only depend on the possibility of branching to transnational networks and 
resources extraversion. This is a similar situation to what the haratin in poor urban areas are 
enduring. 
 
This selective process of globalization from a structural point of view has a critical 
impact on the cultural and symbolic side. From this point of view, globalization is involving 
Mauritanian society more broadly and profoundly, as long as it nourishes new representations 
of modernity and success. Nevertheless, it is striking to note that all these aspirations and 
expectations are fundamentally based on a projection of modernity outside the present-day 
Mauritanian territory. Modernity is something Mauritanians are still waiting for, contrasting 
with a hard daily reality of poverty and underdevelopment. But above all, modernity is 
something projected outside the country, in faraway western or eastern Eldorados in a 
significant example of heterotopy. These contrasts and contradictions are producing two 
different but intertwined effects: on one side, this transfer of an imagined and promised 
modernity into the future or into somewhere else produces a deep frustration. On the other, it 
is exactly from this frustration that new forms of social and cultural ferment can emerge, as in 
the case of the new urban youth but also in new religious fundamentalism. The next few years 
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